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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON HARRIS and 
PEARL A. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
EULA TILLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12619 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought action against the Defendant in 
District Court case No. 188517 to recover amounts ex-
pended and the value of obligations incurred in main-
taining certain real property of the Defendant and fur-
ther, for an equitable lien against said real property to 
secure the payment of the Defendant's indebtedness to 
them. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs a judgment in 
the amount of the indebtedness, together with an equit-
able mortgage to secure that indebtedness. The Defendant 
appealed to this court on issues neither relevant nor sub-
ject of this appeal, and the lower court was affirmed. 
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Plaintiffs sued in District Court case No. 192613 t f o ore. 
close their equitable mortgage whereupon the ' Y were 
awarded a decree of foreclosure and the property was 
sold at Sheriff's sale. Defendant duly filed her claim for 
a homestead exemption and moved the court to determine 
that the Plaintiffs' equitable mortgage was subject to 
her homestead exemption. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court rendered its conclusions of law and 
judgment on July 27, 1971, determining that the equit-
able mortgage given by the Defendant was not within the 
scope of Sections 28-1-1 and 78-23-3, Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1953, and that Defendants giving of said equitable 
mortgage did not constitute a waiver and relinquishment 
of her right to claim a homestead exemption incident to 
the foreclosure of that mortgage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of that judgment entered 
July 27, 1971, and a determination that the Defendants 
giving of an equitable mortgage to Plaintiffs constituted 
a waiver and relinquishment of her right to claim a home· 
stead exemption incident to Plaintiffs' foreclosure of that 
mortgage. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1964, Plantiffs orally agreed to oversee and man· 
age the rental of Defendant's residence at 1968 South 8th 
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fast, in Salt Like City, Utah. (R. 74, 75) In approxi-
mately October of 1965, the Defendant requested the 
Plaintiff, Layton Harris, to co-sign with her on a promis-
sory note pursuant to her obtaining a loan to pay accrued 
and unpaid general real property taxes and to install a 
new roof and furnace in the residence situate on the sub-
ject property. (R. 75, 90, 100, 116) Said Plaintiff agreed 
ro cu-sign the note conditional upon the Defendant giving 
him il quit claim deed to the subject property to protect 
him in the event of the Defendant's default on the note. 
(R. 7 5) The Defendant obtained a loan from First Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association on October 5, 1965 
(R. 77, 91, 100) pursuant to which Layton Harris co-
signed with her on a promissory note in the amount of 
the luan (R. 77, 102) and the Defendant gave Plaintiffs 
a quit claim deed to the subject property. (R. 102) 
The trial court determined that the quit claim deed 
had been given to Plaintiffs to secure Defendant's pay-
ment to them of amounts they incurred in managing and 
maintaining the subject property for the Defendant and 
in making installment payments on the promissory note. 
The court therefore adjudged the deed to be an equitable 
mortgage. ( R. 5) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE GIVING OF AN EQUITABLE MORT-
GAGE ON REAL PROPERTY DID NOT CONSTI-
TUTE A W AIYER AND RELINQUISHMENT OF THE 
MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT TO CLAIM A HOMESTEAD 
EXEMPTION INCIDENT TO THE FORECLOSURE 
OF THAT MORTGAGE. 
Plaintiffs recognize that the homestead exempt' ton, 
as constitutionally created, arises immediately upon the 
qualification of the head of the family, but submit that 
the exemption may be successfully raised against subse-
quent obligations and liens only if not previously waived 
or relinquished. 
At 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead, it is recognized that: 
"In the absence of constitutional or statutory re· 
strictions, the owner of a homestead may mort· 
gage the property, and thereby subject it to sale 
under foreclosure proceedings." Sec. 115 
"Waiver may generally be done in a deed or mort· 
gage." Section 192 
Neither Article XXII, Sec. 1 of the Utah Constitu· 
tion, wherein the homestead exemption is created, nor 
any statute of this State, prohibits the conveyance or mort· 
gaging of homestead property. Rather, at Section 28·1-l, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, it is provided: 
"A homestead consisting of land, appurtenances 
and improvements, . . . shall be exempt from 
judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, 
except upon the following obligations: . · · (2) 
Judgments obtained on debts secured by lauful 
mortgage on the premises and on deb.ts created for 
the purchase price thereof." (Emphasis added) 
It is further provided at Section 78-23-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953: 
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''No article or species of property mentioned in 
this chapter or in the title Homesteads is exempt 
from execution issued upon a judgment recovered 
for its purchase price, or any portion thereof, or 
upon a judgment on foreclosure of a mortgage or 
other valid lien thereon, . . . ." (Emphasis added) 
In Tanner v. Lawler, 6 U 2d 84, 305 P. 2d 882, this 
court recognized the application of the Code Section cited 
first above and in accord therewith, determined that the 
claim of a foreclosing mortgagee is not subject to the 
homestead exemption of the mortgagor. 
It is clear from statute and judicial precedent, that a 
Utah mortgagor is deemed to have waived his homestead 
exemption as against his foreclosing mortgagee. The issue 
then remaining, is whether this waiver is effectively made 
by the giving of an equitable mortgage, or whether it is 
limited only to a giving of an instrument which on its 
face, constitutes a mortgage at law. 
This Court has not been called upon to determine 
whether the aforementioned Code Sections contemplate 
the giving of an equitable mortgage. The Sections them-
selves make no attempt to differentiate between legal and 
equitable mortgages and Plaintiffs submit that no such 
distinction is contemplated nor would be appropriate. 
It is noted that the quit claim deed given by the De-
fendant to the Plaintiffs, and which the lower court has 
construed as a mortgage, did not specifically provide for 
nor recite a waiver of Defendant's homestead. However, 
such a provision or recital in the instrument is not neces-
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sary in order to effect a waiver of the homestead . . . exemp. 
tton. The heremabove cited Code Sections 28-1-1 and 78. 
23-3, specifically provide that a judgment obtained on 
foreclosure of a mortgage takes priority over the home. 
stead exemption of the mortgagor. In addition, Section 
57-1-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth an ap. 
proved form of a statutory mortgage, which form is not-
able for its complete absence of any specific provision 
with reference to the mortgagor's homestead exemption. 
Said Section, in making reference to the form therein 
suggested, further provides: 
"Such mortgage when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land 
therein described, together, with all the rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunder belong· 
ing, to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal 
representatives, as security for the payment of the 
indebtedness therein set forth, .... " (Emphasis 
added) 
This section obviously contemplates the pledge of any and 
all interests of the mortgagor. No provision is made for 
an implied reservation of the homestead interest. This 
court in Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P. 2d 118, 
in construing former Section 78-1-13, Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1943, which Section was identical to the subject 
present Section, determined that the statutory form need 
not be followed, but is only a suggested form. The Coutt 
has further recognized in Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 
117 P. 232, that a deed absolute in form, executed and de· 
livered as a security rather than a conveyance of title, will 
· h f rent that be construed as a mortgage. It ts t ere ore appa 
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Utah law does not require a waiver of homestead to be 
cxpres~ly recited in the mortgage instrument in order for 
that waiver to be effective. 
The lower court determined from the evidence de-
duced at trial, that Plaintiffs and Defendants intended that 
the quit claim deed delivered by Defendant to Plaintiffs 
was to secure any indebtedness incurred by Defendant 
and owed to Plaintiffs incident to the Plaintiffs' man-
agement of the Defendant's subject property and there-
fore, that it was an equitable mortgage rather than an 
absolute conveyance of title. The record shows there to 
have been a voluntary delivery of that document. The 
court determined that a mortgage was thereby intended 
and therefore, it follows that the giving of that mortgage 
was a voluntary act of the Defendant. In other words, the 
Defendant incurred the mortgage no less voluntarily than 
had she done so by the delivery of a statutory mortgage. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties 
had discussed the homestead to which Defendant may 
have been entitled and it is doubtful that Plaintiffs would 
have accepted any mortgage wherein the homestead was 
expressly exempted. 
The lower court, invoking its equitable jurisdiction, 
determined that the Defendant intended to give Plaintiffs 
a mortgage. There was nothing before the court to indi-
cate that Defendant intended to give Plaintiffs any right 
or interest less than that which she would have given had 
she executed and delivered a statutory mortgage. The risk 
assumed by Plaintiffs incident to co-signing Defendant's 
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promissory note was no less than it would have been had 
they been given a statutory mortgage by Defendant to 
secure performance on the note Therefore it was · · ' incon. 
sistent for the lower court to grant Plaintiffs a mortgagees' 
interest any less than that which they would have held 
under a statutory mortgage. 
The Kansas Court in Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. 389, 345 
P. 2d 1015, was confronted with the question of whether 
an equitable mortgage was subject to a claimed home-
stead exemption. Therein said case, it was found that the 
Plaintiffs had loaned money to Defendant's husband to be 
used in purchasing certain real estate. In return for the 
loan, Defendant's husband gave a promissory note to 
Plaintiffs wherein it provided that Plaintiffs were to have 
an interest in the purchase of property to the extent of the 
amount of that loan. Defendant's husband died and the 
real property passed to the Defendant as surviving joint 
tenant. Plaintiffs thereafter sued Defendant requesting 
the court to determine that the note represented an equit· 
able mortgage on the property which they were entitled 
to foreclose. The court held: 
"Money borrowed from a third person by the p~· 
chaser of a homestead, and paid to the vendor, is 
purchase-money for which the purchased prope!cy 
is liable to such third person where the transact~on 
between the parties to the lending transactton 
contemplates security for the obligation. The pur· 
chase-money mortgage arising from such trans· 
action takes priority over the homestead exemp· 
tion . . . and it matters not that such purchase· 
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money mortgage may be an equitable mortgage." 
(Emphasis Added) 345 P. 2d 1024 
The Kansas Court was confronted with a purchase 
money mortgage rather than a mortgage, which as in the 
instant case, was given to secure a loan obtained after the 
property had been purchased. The ruling of that court is 
nevertheless relevant, since the Utah Code Sections here-
inabove cited, make the homestead exemption subject to a 
foreclosure of a mortgage regardless of whether that 
mortgage secures a debt created for the purchase price of 
the property or otherwise. Therefore, there is no reason 
to distinguish between an equitable mortgage as in the 
case at bar and an equitable mortgage given to secure 
purchase money. Equity has re-vested the Defendant with 
title to the property subject of this proceeding, and given 
Plaintiffs only a mortgage to secure the obligations which 
they have assumed incident to their agreement with the 
Defendant. Equity surely was not served when the lower 
court determined the Plaintiffs' mortgage interest to be 
less than that which they would have enjoyed had they 
taken a statutory mortgage. Such determination prevent-
ed the Plaintiffs from recouping the full amount of the 
obligation owed to them by the Defendant. Such recoup-
ment was obviously intended as is evidenced by the giv-
ing and acceptance of the equitable mortgage. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that pursuant to the 
voluntary giving of the equitable mortgage, subject here-
of, Defendant has waived any homestead exemption vest-
9 
ed in her at the date that said mortgage was given and 
therefore, that the lower court judgment of July 27, 1971 
should be reversed and the court directed to enter its 
order directing that the homestead of the Defendant is 
subject to the foreclosure of Plaintiffs' mortgage lien. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BETTILYON & HOW ARD 
GARY A. WESTON 
3 3 3 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Layton Harris and Pearl A. Harris 
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